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ABSTRACT
In this paper I use cross sectional data drawn from the March CPS from 1968 to 1988 and the May CPS
from 1973 to 1988 to estimate the impact of deregulation on labor earnings. Earnings in trucking,
telephones, bus transportation, air lines and railroads are analyzed. Both average differentials and
union-nonunion differentials are computed. Contrary to some popular belief, deregulation is not found
to reduce earnings in many of these industries. Implications for theories of regulatory impact are
discussed.

Introduction
In a 1977 article, Hendricks used data from the 1970 Census of Population
to compare wages in regulated industries with wages paid in manufacturing
industries. The results suggested that the primary source of high wages in
regulated industries was the high degree of unionization in these industries
combined with high levels of concentration in the product market. Except truck
drivers in trucking and electricians in radio and television and possibly in air
transportation, regulated industries typically paid lower wages than unregulated
manufacturing industries when industry and personal characteristics were
controlled.
Since then several natural experiments in deregulation have occurred that
can shed new light on this question. What's more, data now exist yearly on
individual earnings. Some of these data also include union membership
identification. This potentially allows clearer tests of hypotheses about the
impact of the interaction of union membership and regulation on earnings. It
thus seems appropriate to reevaluate the evidence based on the 1980' s experience
with deregulation.
This paper concentrates on the movement of wage differentials between 1967
and 1988 in five industries: telephone service, railroad transportation,
trucking services, airline transportation and bus transportation. Each
experienced some form of deregulation in the later 1970' s or early 1980' s. In
the next section, we summarize the form of deregulation and possible impacts on
labor earnings in each industry.
Background on Deregulation
Airlines
Congress began an era of deregulation with the passage of the Airline
Deregulation Act in 1978. The Act phased out the Civil Aeronautics Board and
made entry and exit from the industry much easier. Since the CAB oversaw merger
activity in the industry, one by-product of deregulation was an easing of
regulations on merger activity. Thus, while passage of the Act encouraged
deconcentration in the industry by freeing up entry, it also allowed more
possibilities for concentration at certain hubs through merger activity. *-
Airline workers are covered under the Railway Labor Act rather than the
National Labor Relations Act. Consequently, all workers are covered by system-
wide agreements rather than agreements tailored to particular markets. If an
airline faces particularly strong competition in one market, it cannot attempt
to get wage concessions from workers in that market. It must get concessions
from workers throughout the system. Thus entry of low cost, non-union firms in a
few markets could potentially have impacts throughout the industry.
Most observers believed that the airline industry would be "workably
contestable" in the absence of regulation. Regulation was viewed as increasing
prices to customers. Thus, they expected deregulation to reduce union power.
In the most comprehensive study of the impact of deregulation on earnings
in airlines, Card(1989) found almost no deregulation impact when comparing pre-
and post-deregulation earnings in airlines with earnings of production workers.
Trucking
While Congress passed the Motor Carrier Act that deregulated trucking in
1980, most analysts use 1979 as the start of deregulation. The Interstate
1 For a more thorough discussion of the effects of deregulation, see Moore
(1986) .
Commerce Commission (ICC) had started reforms in late 1978 that had begun
effective deregulation of entry and rates.
There seemed little question that trucking would be highly competitive in
the absence of regulation. Thus, a strong case could be made for the prediction
of a decline in union power in the industry after deregulation. While the impact
of deregulation on union earnings seems clear cut, its effect on non-union wages
is more ambiguous. Non-union wages might have been higher in the industry
because of the threat of unionization. A reduction in union power therefore also
might bring on a decrease in non-union wages. On the other hand, deregulation
might act to increase the demand for non-union truck drivers and increase their
wages relative to workers in other industries.
Two major papers have covered the impact of deregulation on earnings in
trucking. Both Rose(1987) and Hirsch(1988) concentrate on the impact of
deregulation on the union wage differential. Both find a decline in the
differential after deregulation. In addition Hirsch(1988) finds no change in the
differential between non-union drivers and operatives after deregulation.
Railroads
While the predictions associated with institutional reform seem clear cut
in airlines and trucking, they become more ambiguous in railroads. The amount of
competition that would exist in the industry without regulation has always been
controversial. Even without competition from other railroads, pricing by
individual roads will still be constrained by potential competition from trucks.
How much this potential competition constrains market power is open to question.
The major change in railroad regulation in the 1980' s was the passage of
the Staggers Act in 1980. The Act did not deregulate the industry, but it did
allow significantly more flexibility for individual railroads to abandon non-
profitable runs and provided more flexibility to raise or lower prices.
Most analysts believed that the Staggers Act would allow railroads to lower
prices and capture traffic from other modes. If price cutting became the norm,
an effect on union wages similar to the trucking effect might have occurred. But
2rail rates increased after deregulation.^ The combination of decreased rates in
trucking due to concurrent deregulation in that area and increased rates in
railroads meant that the market share for railroads declined. Thus, the impact
of deregulation on earnings in railroads is unclear. The increase in rates could
mean that the companies were using their market power to move toward monopoly
restriction of output. Railroad unions could use their power to demand a share
of these rents. Still, increased ability to shut down unprofitable lines could
have shifted bargaining power in favor of management, leading to a reduction in
relative wages. Clifford et al (1990) citing the American Association of
Railroads claim that deregulation led to a 20% decline in wages for railroad
workers and a loss to labor of $1 billion (1977 dollars)
.
Inter-city Busing
Prior to passage of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act in 1982, there were two
major carriers in the industry, Greyhound and Trailways. With passage of the
act, Congress granted bus companies greater flexibility in rate making and
greater ease of entry and exit. This led to a reduction of service.
Dempsey(1988) estimates that 4514 communities lost service while 896 gained
service. In addition, Greyhound and Trailways merged in 1987, leaving only one
large firm in the industry.
^
Like railroads, the impact of bus deregulation on labor earnings is
ambiguous. Virtual monopoly by Greyhound could lead to increases in rents that
2 See Boyer(1987) for a more detailed account of the movement of relative prices
and market shares.
3 Greyhound Corporation no longer owns Greyhound Bus Lines, although they do own
a few small carriers. As part of the sale, they agreed not to reenter the
industry prior to March, 1992.
could be absorbed by the unions. On the other hand, management ability to drop
unprofitable routes could cause a shift in relative power and a reduction in
relative wages.
Telephones
Most of the telephone service industry has not been deregulated. Local
service remains tightly regulated by the states and AT&T long-distance service is
also regulated. Only the new entrants in the long distance market are
unregulated, but they employ less than three percent of telephone service
workers
.
The major changes that have occurred in the industry involve the
divestiture of the Bell Operating Companies in 1984 and the subsequent changes in
bargaining structure in the industry. Prior to divestiture, the centralized
agreement between AT&T and the Communications Workers and the IBEW was the
largest in the country and covered over 600,000 workers. After divestiture the
unions had to bargain separately with AT&T and the seven regional holding
companies .
^
There are several reasons for believing that regional or local bargaining
might result in lower settlements. First, regulatory agencies might be more
prone to question high wage costs when there is not a "national" agreement .
Second, management at several new Bell Operating Companies (BOC s) expressed the
view that AT&T had given them a legacy of wages that were 20% to 30% too high for
their labor markets (Perry and Cappelli, 1988). They were determined to bring
wages more in line with local competition. Third, several BOCs were committed to
a business strategy of expansion into competitive areas where competition in
labor costs was more intense.
A A detailed account of changes in bargaining in telecommunications can be found
in Hendricks (forthcoming)
Contrary to these predictions, Peoples (forthcoming) found no change or a
slight increase in relative wages for operators after divestiture.
Regulation Impact on Earnings
Regulation could increase earnings in two ways. First, earnings could be
higher in regulated industries than in industries with similar structure if
regulatory agencies set prices in an attempt to guarantee rents for the firms in
the industry. The sharing of these rents was once viewed as purely a union
phenomenon. However, recent "insider models," efficiency wage models and models
that rely on notions of fairness and ability to pay, all suggest that there is
potential for non-union workers to share in these rents as well (Dickens and
Katz, 1987).
Second, earnings could be higher in regulated industries due to
restrictions on entry. These restrictions probably would lead to higher union
density and firm concentration that would exist in their absence. To the extent
that both are associated with higher earnings, wage differentials with other
industries would increase.
If the first explanation of regulation impact is correct, a regression of
labor earnings on worker characteristics, industry characteristics and industry
identifiers should yield positive wage differentials for regulated industries.
If the second explanation is correct, a regression that includes worker
characteristics should yield positive differentials, but inclusion of industry
characteristics should drive these differentials to zero.
If the sharing of rents is purely a union phenomenon, then union members'
wages should be increased more by regulation than nonunion workers' wages. The
union-nonunion differential would then be larger in these industries.
i
Suppose that we now introduce deregulation of rates and allow more entry
into the industry. If the first explanation of regulatory impact is correct,
wage differentials should fall in regressions that either include or exclude
industry characteristics. If the second explanation is correct, then no change
in differentials should be observable in regressions that include industry
characteristics. If the sharing of rents occurred only for union workers, a
narrowing of the union-nonunion differential should be evident.
Thus estimation of a time series of wage differentials for deregulated
industries under alternative specifications should provide significant
information to evaluate different views of the impact of regulatory policy on
labor earnings.
Earnings Data and Individual Characteristics
This paper uses three sources of wage data. The first provides monthly
average hourly wages for production workers collected by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics and published in the Monthly Labor Review. These data are available
for the telephone industry, trucking and railroads, but are not available for
airlines or buses. We collected data between January, 1968 and December, 1988.
The second source of wage data is the Annual Demographic File of the
Current Population Survey (CPS) . This file provides retrospective information
collected in March of each year for the previous year's earnings. We have
collected data from March 1968 through March 1989 (excluding 1983). These data
therefore cover the period 1967 to 1988. Card(1989) used the 1977 through 1988
March data in his analysis of airline earnings.
The third source of wage data is the "earnings supplement" questionnaire of
the CPS. These data are gathered from respondents who will not be interviewed
8the following month (the "outgoing rotation group (OGRG)"). The questions refer
to earnings and employment information from the previous week. Beginning in
1973, the May OGRG were asked questions about union membership. Beginning in
1983, the March OGRG were also asked the union membership question. We gathered
data from the May OGRG covering the period 1973 to 1988 and from the March OGRG
covering the period 1983 to 1988. The March and May data from 1983 to 1988 were
merged and are called "May" data in this paper. The union membership question
was not asked in 1982 and these data are not included. Both Rose(1987) and
Hirsch(1988) used 1973 through 1985 May data (excluding 1982) in their analyses
of earnings in the trucking industry; Card(1989) used 1979 through 1988 in his
analysis of airline earnings; Peoples(forthcoming) used 1977 through 1988 in his
analysis of earnings for telephone operators.
Each of these sources has drawbacks . -* The BLS data yield only industry
average wages. It is therefore difficult to control for quality differences in
labor forces that might change over time. This problem can be potentially
overcome in both CPS samples. The March data carry the advantage of larger
sample sizes and correspondingly smaller estimated errors. Unlike the BLS
average hourly earnings series and the May weekly earnings data, March averages
may be strongly influenced by the number of hours worked and the number of weeks
worked by part time workers. To compensate for this problem, the March data. are
restricted to individuals who reported working at least 26 weeks in the previous
year, who earned at least $1000, and who worked for only one employer. The May
data have the strong advantage of identifying union members. Unfortunately, the
sample sizes are somewhat small. In addition, average weekly earnings are
censored at $999 per week (compared to $99,999 per year in the March data).
5 Card(1989) provides a detailed comparison of the problems associated with the
two CPS files.
Industry Characteristics
Data on union density by industry were gathered from Freeman and
Medoff(1979) , Kokkelenberg and Sockell(1985) and Curme , Hirsch and
Macpherson(1989) 6 .
Data on adjusted concentration ratios were taken from Weiss (1966) and
Weiss and Pascoe (1986). These sources provide estimates of concentration ratios
for manufacturing industries based on data from 1962, 1972 and 1977. Values
between 1967 to 1971 were estimated as weighted linear combinations of the
estimates for 1962 and 1972. The same procedure was used for the years between
1972 and 1977. An estimate of the adjusted concentration ratio for 1982 was
obtained by multiplying the measured concentration ratio for 1982 by the ratio of
the adjusted to the measured value for 1977. Values for years between 1977 and
1982 were estimated as weighted linear combinations of the estimates for 1977 and
1982. Since the 1987 concentration ratios have not been published, the values
for 1982 were used for 1982 to 1988.
Data on adjusted concentration ratios for regulated industries were
estimated following the approach in Weiss(1966) and Hendricks(1977)
.
Unfortunately, very little data exist to evaluate the impact of deregulation on
changes in concentration ratios. Except airlines, no changes in these data were
available. For airlines, the Department of Transportation(1990) published
concentration figures for city pairs for 1979 through 1988. These figures were
used to estimate concentration in the airline industry.
Since inclusion of a measure of concentration restricts the sample to only
manufacturing and selected regulated industries, the sample sizes are much
smaller for these regressions. What's more, there is probably substantial error
6 We would like to thank Barry Hirsch for providing the density data for 1983
on diskette.
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in the concentration measure. Therefore, we have also run regressions that
include the density measure but exclude concentration.
Results
Figures la to lc graph the yearly percentage differential between
manufacturing production workers and each deregulated industry for data from BLS
average production worker wages, March yearly earnings and May weekly earnings
data respectively. Railroad workers have the highest average differential over
the period, averaging 49-54%' in the March-May data and 38% in the BLS data.
They are followed by airline and phone workers who averaged 35-39% in the March-
May data (phone workers averaged 20% in the BLS data) . Trucking differentials
averaged 25% in the BLS data, 14% in the March data and 21% in the May data. Bus
workers had negative differentials throughout the period that averaged
approximately 26% in the March-May data.
The raw differentials show a significant decline in earnings after
deregulation for only one industry, trucking. There is no difference in the
differential in the March data (covering 1967 to 1988), a 7% decline in the BLS
data (covering 1968-1988) that is almost significant and a 10% decline in the May
data (covering 1973 to 1988) . Obviously this measurement is influenced by the
length of the time series. The trucking wage differential with manufacturing
peaked just before deregulation in the March-May data and in 1973 in the BLS
(
7 The average values reported are computed by taking a weighted average of the
coefficients for individuals years using the inverse of the estimated variance of
the coefficients as weights. The percentages are computed as (e""^-l) x 100%
where is the regression coefficient and e is the natural log. The estimated
average coefficients (0s) and their associated standard errors are given in Table
1.
<
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data. If the May data existed for 1967-1972, a smaller change in the
differential would have been estimated.
In the four other industries the differential had a significant increase in
at least one data series. The telephone earnings differential increased between
9 and 20 points and the increase was significant in all three data sets. The
railroad differential increased by 17% in the BLS and March data series but only
2% in the May series. Busing showed an increase in the May data, but a decrease
in the March data (not significant). Finally, airlines showed a modest 4%
increase in the March data and no change in the May data.
Figures 2a-b provide the same wage differentials controlling for worker
characteristics (age, education, marital status, veteran status, gender, race,
occupation, weeks worked and hours per week)° in the March and May data.
Differentials for railroads, airlines and telephone remain high, averaging 20 to
28% over the period. The trucking differential falls to zero when worker
characteristics are included and the bus differential improves to -14% to -21%.
The comparisons of pre- and post-deregulation eras provide similar results to the
raw differentials. Both airline and railroad differentials have significant
increases in both data sets (8 to 11% for railroads and 4% to 10% for phones).
The trucking differential decreased by 3% while the airlines differential
increased 5% using the March data, but neither showed a significant change in the
May data. The busing differential again showed a significant increase in the May
data (10%) but little change in the March data.
Figure 3 provides evidence on movement of the union-nonunion differential
in phones, trucking, airlines, railroads and the all-industry average from the
May data, 1973-1988. These series were estimated from yearly regressions that
included individual characteristics, a union membership dummy variable and
8Appendix one provides a detailed list of the control variables used in these
regressions
.
12
interaction terms between the dummy and industry dummy variables. The average
union-nonunion differential increased to a peak in 1977, and then declined
slightly until 1983. The average over the period was 25%. Both trucking (40%)
and airlines (30%) had higher union differentials than average; both also peaked
in 1977 and fell even more dramatically than the average between 1978 and 1983.
While unions in both industries rebounded after the period, the decline from 49%
to 32% for the Teamsters was significant, while a smaller 6% erosion was
experienced by the airlines unions (not significant)
.
Both the telephone and the railroad industry have had somewhat small union-
nonunion differentials. This may be due to the small number of nonunion workers
in these industries. Rail industries averaged a modest 8% differential while the
differential for phone workers was negative. Both expanded the differential
after deregulation. This brought the union workers in telephones on par with
nonunion workers (a significant increase in the differential) and increased the
differential in railroads to about 18% (an insignificant increase in the
differential)
.
A similar pattern of movement in wage differentials is apparent with raw
differentials, differentials controlling for worker characteristics and union-
nonunion differentials. The impact on worker earnings seems dependent on the
extent of new competition in the industry. None of the industries experienced
the declines in relative earnings that occurred in trucking. The trucking
decline also was almost exclusively a union phenomenon - the decline for average
workers in the industry was small or non-existent. What's more, relative
earnings may have even increased in several of these industries. These results
suggest that pre-deregulation pricing policies may not have been a source of
increased earnings for workers in these industries.
(
i
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Further evidence on the regulation impact is provided in figures 4a-4b and
5a- 5b. Figures 4a and 4b plot yearly wage differentials controlling for union
density and worker characteristics; figures 5a and 5b plot yearly wage
differentials controlling for density, worker characteristics and product market
concentration (by inclusion of concentration and a density-concentration
interaction term). While there is some yearly fluctuation, almost the entire raw
wage differential in trucking and railroads is explained by worker
characteristics and union density. This is not true in telephones and airlines.
They maintain differentials averaging approximately 10% and 19% respectively. In
busing the raw differential is largely unaffected by the union density measure.
As was found by Hendricks(1977) , inclusion of concentration in addition to
union density explains the remaining differential in airlines and telephones. In
the March data, the highest average differential for 1967-1988 occurred in
trucking at a modest 3%; in the May data the highest value occurred for airlines
at 7%.
The results for the change in the differential are a mixed bag. Both the
March and May data show a decline in the trucking differential after
deregulation. Since this estimate controls for the decline in union density in
trucking, it provides some evidence that the fall in relative wages may not be
entirely explained by the entry of nonunion competition. Railroads and busing
show similar declines after deregulation. The busing result might be explained
by the monopsony effect of the Greyhound merger. However, the railroad result is
puzzling and in direct conflict with the positive estimations in other
specifications
.
The March data show a small increase in the differential controlling for
industry structure for both airlines and telephones. The May data, however,
14
suggest a decline. It is therefore difficult to draw any conclusions based on
these results for these industries.
Summary and Conclusions
We have tried to estimate the impact of deregulation on earnings in several
industries. A comparison of these impacts indicates that deregulation, per se,
is not necessarily bad news for workers. In some industries, deregulation has
allowed firms to increase their control in some markets and raise prices. This
has occurred, in part, due to the much more lax approach taken to horizontal
mergers in the 1980 's than in previous decades. Thus, the notion that regulation
has served simply to pass through costs to consumers cannot be totally accurate.
Some workers' earnings have increased after deregulation.
The strongest deregulation impact, no matter how it's measured, occurred in
trucking. But even here, the impact has been almost solely in the union sector.
What's more, deregulation has had a substantial impact on employment in the
industry. Figure 6 shows employment for trucking, telephones, railroads and
motor vehicles (as a control) . While employment has been somewhat constant in
telephones and motor vehicles, railroad employment has been continually declining
and trucking employment has had a large upswing since deregulation. It is
unclear, a priori, whether workers are better off with declining employment and
expanding wage differentials or expanding employment and shrinking
differentials
.
These results suggest that regulation' s primary impact in the labor market
has been to shield union workers from nonunion competition. Narrowing union-
nonunion differentials in trucking and airlines are the apparent reasons for the
15
widely held view that deregulation has been very bad for workers. Average wages
in these industries have been affected very little by deregulation.
16
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Appendix
The regressions performed on the March and May CPS data were estimated
yearly (1967 to 1988 for March and 1973 to 1988 for May). Each yearly regression
was of the general form:
23 42 45 50
log(earnings)j= £ a^ Industry jj + Y,@i WC ij + L T i IC ij + E 5 i UNI0N ij + £j
i-1 i-24 i-43 i=46
where
log( earnings )
-j
- log of yearly earnings for the March data and log of weekly
earnings for the May data for the j c" individual
.
Indus tryji - Dummy variables for regulated industries (rail, bus, taxi, trucking,
warehousing, water transportation, air, pipelines, radio and
television, phone, telegraph, electricity, gas, electricity and gas
combinations, sanitary) and non- manufacturing industries (mining,
construction, trade, finance, repair, home services and other). The
excluded category was manufacturing. The non-manufacturing dummies
were not included in the regressions that included concentration
ratio.
WCij - A series of worker characteristics variables including potential
experience (measured by age and age^) , education (years completed)
,
marital status (dummy), veteran status (dummy), gender, race (dummy
variable for Caucasian race), occupation (9 1-digit census occupation
dummy variables) and location (dummy variable for residence in the
South) . In addition regressions using the March data included
controls for weeks worked last year and hours worked last year. The
regressions using the May data included a control for usual hours
worked per week.
ICji - Industry characteristics of the industry for the j c" individual. These
characteristics were union density, concentration ratio measured as
the (corrected) 4-digit concentration, and an interaction term
between density and concentration.
UNIONij - A dummy variable for union status and interactions between this dummy
and the dummy variables for railroad industry, airline industry,
telephone industry and trucking industry. These dummies were only
included in the regressions that estimate union-nonunion
differentials from the May data.
e^ - individual error term
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